Recognition and Deliberation: A Deliberative Corrective to Liberal Multicultural Policies

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Abstract
This article establishes theoretical and practical distinctions between the theory of recognition and liberal multiculturalism. Five potential issues with multicultural policies are identified. The article argues that an increase in deliberative practices could solve many pitfalls of liberal multicultural policies and highlights how a "deliberative turn" could reconcile identity-related policies with the philosophical roots of the theory of recognition. The paper also highlights some challenges arising from a deliberative approach to recognition.

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Keywords
recognition, deliberation, multiculturalism, identity

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Introduction

Identity-related political issues are a common theme in contemporary political theory. Since the early nineties a number of theorists developed theoretical frameworks centred on recognition (Honneth, 1996; Taylor, 1994; Young, 2011). In parallel to these theoretical developments, some liberal thinkers developed theories of multiculturalism that aimed to reconcile “difference blind” liberalism with the plural nature of most Western societies (Kymlicka, 2000; Parekh, 2006). While the theory of recognition started, in many cases, as a separate paradigm strongly rooted in continental philosophy, it was progressively joined together with liberal multiculturalism and subsumed under the broader category of “identity politics.” Policies influenced by liberal multiculturalism are now currently understood as policies of recognition. These policies usually focus on group-differentiated rights, cultural preservation, and are developed in a top-down fashion with minimal input from the populations at stake. They may include (among other): land rights for indigenous people, guaranteed representation in parliament, minority language preservation initiatives, dress code accommodations, differentiated school curriculum or health care systems. Some authors have argued that, in many cases, multiculturalism has become a neoliberal tool of governance (Hale, 2005) and that the representatives of the target populations involved in the process tend to be market-oriented identity entrepreneurs (Bowen, 2011). The extent to which the plans and ideas of these elites represent the common views of their constituencies is uncertain. In New Zealand, for example, financial redress for the dispossession of Māori land led to the rise of a neotribal indigenous capitalist elite (Rata, 2005). In this article, I will focus mainly on indigenous recognition. Indeed, “the way that the position of indigenous peoples in modern states has come to serve as a template for political theorists” (McBride, 2005, p. 509) may have played a role in the theoretical confusion at stake. The observations offered in the article do, however, apply to the recognition of many non-indigenous groups as well.

Nicholas Smith (2012) explains that it is a mistake to reduce the theory of recognition to multiculturalist accounts. In this article, I decouple these two theoretical frameworks. I do not, however, argue against group-differentiated rights influenced by liberal multiculturalism as such. Rather, I argue in favour of a deliberative corrective to these policies and, therefore, offer a deliberative approach to recognition that will contribute to the ongoing debate over deliberative/discursive approaches to recognition. More particularly, I discuss how increased deliberation can solve many pitfalls of liberal multicultural policies by focusing on some common criticisms raised against liberal
multiculturalism and theories of recognition. I also highlight how this “deliberative turn” can reconcile these multicultural policies with the philosophical roots of the theory of recognition. I also discuss and answer some potential criticisms against the proposed deliberative approach to recognition.

This article is divided into five sections. Section one discusses the theory of recognition. It highlights different aspects of the theory and engages with some key theorists. Section two discusses liberal multiculturalism. The most common differentiated rights inherent to that theoretical paradigm, and their justifications, are explained. The section also underlines some important criticisms raised against identity politics. Section three establishes a relation between the theory of recognition and deliberative democracy. This part of the paper makes the argument that deliberative practices offer some answers to the criticisms against identity politics raised in the previous section and explains how relations of recognition could be embedded in a deliberative system. Section four highlights some challenges arising from a deliberative approach to recognition. Section five summarises the paper and explores some key questions that could be used as a first step towards a research programme that emphasises the importance of identity relations in deliberative practices.

The theory of recognition

Most of the first theorists of recognition, such as Axel Honneth (1996, 2003) and Charles Taylor (1994, 1999), established a paternity link between their politics of recognition and Hegel’s (1997) famous lordship and bondage dialectic (also known as master-slave dialectic). The master-slave dialectic is probably the best-known passage in the Phenomenology of Spirit. In this part of his work, Hegel elaborates the idea that one’s identity and self-consciousness needs recognition by another self to fully develop itself. Hegel (1997) states, “self-consciousness exists in and for itself when, and by the fact that, it so exists for another; that is, it exists only in being acknowledged” (p. 111). In order to explain how to reach such mutual recognition, Hegel tells the reader a story staging a confrontation between two consciousnesses mutually denying recognition to the other and trying to prove their liberty to their opponent by risking their life in a struggle to death. The struggle eventually ends when one of the two consciousnesses, afraid of losing its life, becomes the servant of the other. This leads to an asymmetric relation of recognition where the master is recognised by a consciousness which he himself does not recognise. The recognition is, therefore, unsatisfactory because it is not a mutual recognition taking place between equals. In the end, ironically, it is the dominated consciousness, the slave, that reaches the truth of its certainty through the experience of work.

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1 Even if it is a less accurate translation of the original German terms I will stick to the “master-slave” translation since it is most commonly used.
At this stage, it is important to notice two things about Hegel’s (1997) parable since it represents the theoretical foundation of the contemporary politics of recognition. First, the type of recognition advocated by Hegel in this passage from the *Phenomenology of Spirit* is a face to face, unmediated, recognition between potential equals. Hegel clearly saw unilateral recognition as a problem and the Hegelian ideal of recognition, therefore, advocates for *mutual* recognition as the only genuine form of recognition. *Reciprocity* is needed for the concept to be meaningful. These concepts also inform the theoretical framework of deliberative democracy. Second, and most importantly, what needs to be recognised through a struggle for recognition is *freedom*. Each consciousness risks its life in order to prove their freedom to the other. This second point is crucial to critique the idea that struggles for recognition can be reduced to struggles for the recognition of some cultural aspects of one’s identity.

If we accept that the self’s identity is the product of an intersubjective process, it also means that the “other” is potentially the cause of identity-related issues. If the other can be the source of a positive image of oneself, it can also be the source of negative feeling about one’s worth. This is the starting point of Charles Taylor’s theory of recognition. In *The Politics of Recognition*, Taylor (1994) starts from this intuition:

> The thesis is that our identity is partly shaped by recognition or its absence, often by the *misrecognition* of others, and so a person or a group of people can suffer real damage, real distortion, if the people or society around them mirror back to them a confining or demeaning or contemptible picture of themselves. Nonrecognition or misrecognition can inflict harm, can be a form of oppression, imprisoning someone in a false, distorted, and reduced mode of being. (p. 25)

Another key theorist of recognition, Honneth (1996), focuses his analysis on this experience and offers a phenomenological analysis of the experience of misrecognition. According to him, all political struggles are identity struggles, even when they appear outwardly to claim a fairer redistribution of wealth or radical economic reforms. Basing his analysis on the research of historians and sociologists such as E. P. Thompson and Barrington Moore, Honneth (2003) argues that “the experience of the violation of locally transmitted claims to honor” (p. 131) is the most important motivational factor leading to political resistance and protest. Therefore, Honneth develops a theory where recognition is at the center of all political struggles. If we follow Honneth’s thesis, all political struggles are struggles for recognition in so far as they are motivated by a feeling of disrespect and humiliation for one’s identity and a struggle is, therefore, waged in order to have that particular identity respected. In other words, Honneth explains that social injustice is experienced whenever normative expectations for recognition are violated through the unexplainable devaluation of certain particular identities within a given social order. There is
a strong normative dimension within this theory. Indeed, it does not reduce social discontent to materialistic claims for wealth redistribution but rather ties the idea of social justice to a struggle for honor, dignity and moral principles. It is important to note that Honneth focuses his attention on forms of misrecognition that arise from the experience of humiliation and disrespect arising from different contexts, such as work, but does not, however, offer any sustained discussion on multiculturalism (Smith, 2012, pp. 175-176). Nothing in this theoretical model leads to the conclusion that the identity that needs to be respected can be reduced to simple ascriptive categories such as race or sexual preferences. In fact, reducing one’s identity to ascriptive descriptions could very well be a form of misrecognition.

This is what Jean-Philippe Deranty and Emmanuel Renault (2007) argue. According to them, relating the concept of recognition back to its Hegelian root means considering identity as “pure” or “absolute” negativity and to consider subjectivity as “the absolute power of negation” meaning “the power to abstract from any particular identity, be it given by nature or society” (Deranty & Renault, 2007, p. 105). Even if such interpretation (which focuses on the meaning of recognition as theorized through Hegel’s parable) of the master-slave dialectic downplays some aspects of Hegel’s understanding of ethical life (Sittlichkeit), this conception of subjectivity as negativity has a major advantage. Indeed, understanding identity in such a way allows the theorist to be free from “the charge of reifying identity and groups” (Deranty & Renault, 2007, p. 105) and to relate the ideal of recognition to freedom instead of identity. Indeed, sticking to the Hegelian parable of the master-slave dialectic allows them to conclude that:

> What individuals want to have recognized in the struggle for recognition is therefore, strictly speaking, not so much their positive identity, rather it is their identity as negative, their freedom to posit their own identity. Recognition is claimed as a right to self-empowerment, as the right to self-creativity and self-realization, not with the aim of entrenching fixed identities. (Deranty & Renault, 2007, p. 107)

Despite the above-mentioned theoretical insights, the theory of recognition has become, in many cases, conflated with liberal multiculturalism. Even some aspects of Taylor’s (1999) theory tend to reduce questions of recognition to group-differentiated policies aimed at preserving cultural identity and entrenching identities. In this respect, his emphasis on the importance of the ideal of authenticity is particularly problematic (Taylor, 1994). In the next section, I discuss liberal multiculturalism and focus on some of the criticisms raised against “identity politics.” I show that these criticisms only apply to the theory of recognition when it is reduced to political practices embedded in liberal multicultural policies.
Recognition and liberal multiculturalism

Will Kymlicka is one of the leading theorists in the field of liberal multiculturalism. He argues that “the state unavoidably promotes certain cultural identities, and thereby disadvantages others” (Kymlicka, 2000, p. 108). Contra theorists who argue that liberalism is necessarily hostile to social heterogeneity, Kymlicka (2000) argues that liberalism is compatible with the recognition of cultural membership and that it can accommodate difference.

Kymlicka (2000) argues that the protection of cultural plurality is a requirement of liberalism in culturally plural societies because cultural membership is essential to autonomy and increases citizens’ freedom. The ability for a citizen to keep her culture of origin and adopt any particular conception of the good, and the feeling of cultural belonging related to cultural identity, are important aspects of freedom providing people with a sense of self-respect (Kymlicka, 2000). Cultural membership shapes our autonomy as we derive our context of choice from our cultural belonging. Social plurality also increases our exposure to different conceptions of the good and individuals should be free to move from group to group and have a “right to exit” in a liberal multicultural society. Given the importance of cultural membership and pluralism to the liberal project, Kymlicka (2000), therefore, offers a liberal framework that advocates for the just treatment of minority groups and the protection of their cultures through two main types of “group-differentiated rights” (pp. 26-33).

Kymlicka (2000) distinguishes between self-government rights (related to distinct national groups, or societal cultures, living within the border of a state) and polyethnic rights (related to migrant identities in their host societies). The former category covers principally the right to territorial self-determination and can be implemented through various forms of federal arrangements. For example, in some countries, indigenous people have a certain amount of political control over their reserves and can exercise customary law practices (Van Der Hammen, 2003). The second category covers the protection of cultural distinctiveness for minority ethnic groups against the assimilationist tendencies inherent to the necessary process of integration within the host society. In the case of polyethnic rights, public funding of cultural practices as well as changes in education curriculum and minor legal accommodations (such as those related to dress code) can help minority groups to retain their cultural identities. Amendments to dress codes are an obvious example of this type of rights. Self-determination rights are, however, not legitimate for this group. According to Kymlicka (2000), both national and ethnic minority groups can also claim special representation rights within the political structure of the state. This can be achieved through reserved seats for minorities (Xanthaki & O’Sullivan, 2009) within the legislature and making political parties more inclusive of different identities. Many countries have adopted such strategies for minority ethnic or religious groups. Given these theoretical developments, multiculturalism is usually understood as a theory of “group rights.” Bhikhu
Parekh (2006) argues that it is a mistake to believe that only individuals can be bearer of rights and he claims that collectivities are “independent entities making autonomous claims of their own” (p. 214).

The identity turn in political theory received criticisms from some egalitarian liberals and neo-Marxists who interpreted this theoretical development as a challenge to their (amongst other) ideal of equality. Here, I identify five key potential issues with policies of recognition that are subsumed under a liberal multicultural paradigm.

First is the reification issue. This issue was raised by Nancy Fraser in her debate with Honneth (Fraser & Honneth, 2003) and relates to the idea that “identity politics” simplifies the complex notion of identity and divides society into discrete, well-defined, groups (Fraser, 2003). According to her the theory of recognition, therefore, reify identities and tend to encourage “separatism, intolerance and chauvinism, patriarchalism and authoritarianism” (Fraser, 2003, p. 108). Her criticism was in fact, however, more targeted at theories of multiculturalism than at theories of recognition such as Honneth’s. Brian Barry (2001) targets the same issue but more specifically focuses on theories advocating for group-differentiated policies. Barry is highly critical of the idea that one’s ancestry or environment at birth should determine one’s way of life and be a justification for group-differentiated rights. He identifies a strong relationship between counter-enlightenment romantic nationalist ideas emphasising the ties between a Volk and its Geist and the emphasis on authenticity embedded in some identity politics. According to Barry (2001), this emphasis is problematic from a liberal egalitarian perspective. Some critiques on the left such as Richard Ford (2002) further argue that this emphasis on reified tradition also strangely turned an inherently progressive project into “an essentially conservative project of cultural preservation and a fetishism of pedigree and tradition” (p. 48).

The critique of reification can lead to a critique of the notion of group rights as such. Barry argues that the notion is theoretically problematic because in the end group-differentiated rights still benefit individuals (as members of groups) and not the groups qua groups (Kymlicka would, in fact, agree with that statement). Even differentiated policies related to deprivation are still not “group policies” and remain universalistic in nature because, in the end, “different people receive different treatment in accordance with their needs, but everybody with the same need receives the same treatment” (Barry, 2001, p. 114). Barry also points at the difficulty of defining group membership as both under-inclusivity and over-inclusivity create problems. Under-inclusivity might leave very similar people “outside” of the group and create injustice for those

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2 This explains the strange exchange between the two authors who seem to be talking about different things when they talk about recognition. Fraser’s misreading of Honneth’s work was identified by Christopher Zurn (2003).
who do not benefit from a particular policy despite their ties to the identity at stake while over-inclusivity discredits the pertinence of the group-differentiated policy in the first place.

Second is the displacement issue. Fraser also theorised this issue in her debate with Axel Honneth (Fraser & Honneth, 2003). She argues that there is a tendency in contemporary political theory to divide political movements into proponents of either cultural recognition or economic redistribution. But in her view, both paradigms answer only one special type of injustice and both should be embraced simultaneously. Focusing on identity-related issues is problematic because economic injustice still plays a key role in generating social suffering amongst vulnerable populations. In other words, the theory of recognition would focus on symbolic issues related to identity but would forget about economic problems. Barry (2001) echoes Fraser’s concern over identity politics’ disregard for deeply unjust economic issues such as wealth concentration and increased worker immiseration. Fraser develops a conception of justice that is relevant to the deliberative approach to recognition developed in this article as it is centred on the ideal of participatory parity. According to her, both cultural/identity recognition and redistributive justice aim at achieving the ideal of parity of participation (Fraser, 2003). The idea that “justice requires social arrangements that permit all to participate as peers in social life” (Fraser, 2008, p. 277), therefore, makes deliberative democracy a key tool in achieving justice.

The criticism centred on displacement, however, applies only to some theorists of liberal multiculturalism and recognition. Honneth and Renault’s theories, for example, are mainly focused on issues of economic deprivation and this criticism hardly applies to their theoretical framework. Even other theorists such as Taylor do raise concerns about economic deprivation as part of their theory of recognition.

Third, the “divide and rule issue” refers to a potential fragmentation of demands for justice under particularistic claims. The result of this phenomenon would be the weakening of a more radical, united, front of marginalised groups. Barry (2001) argues that

The proliferation of special interests fostered by multiculturalism is, furthermore, conducive to a politics of ‘divide and rule’ that can only benefit those who benefit most from the status quo. There is no better way of heading off the nightmare of unified political action by the economically disadvantaged that might issue in common demands than to set different groups of disadvantaged against one another. (pp. 11-12)

This issue is particularly relevant when access to natural resources is at stake. It is not uncommon to see various disadvantaged groups fighting over access to a particular natural resource and/or territory and, therefore, looking at each other
as competitors over resources while the entity currently controlling (the central state for example) the resources use these conflicts to maintain the status quo. In Colombia, for example, indigenous, Afro-Colombians (who both benefit from differentiated land rights since the 1991 Constitution that recognised the ethnic diversity of the nation) and *mestizo* peasants are sometimes in conflict over access to land despite sharing very similar living conditions (Bocajero, 2009).

The “divide and rule” problem can also be generated by ill-devised deliberative practices. Cass Sunstein (2002) described a phenomenon—the law of group polarisation—that arises from what he calls “enclave deliberation.” Sunstein describes enclave deliberation as a process that involves “deliberation among like-minded people who talk or even live, much of the time, in isolated enclaves” (p. 177). According to him, enclave deliberation represents a danger for social stability because discussion among like-minded people does not lead to open-mindedness and a re-evaluation of one’s views but instead entrenches political views within groups and leads opinion towards extremes. There are two main reasons behind such phenomena. First, people want to maintain their reputations and be perceived positively by others, therefore, “once they hear what others believe, they adjust their positions in the direction of the dominant position” (Sunstein, 2002, p. 179). Second, “because a group whose members are already inclined in a certain direction will have a disproportionate number of arguments supporting that same direction, the result of discussion will be to move individuals further in the direction of their initial inclinations” (Sunstein, 2002, p. 179). It is also very likely that counter-arguments to the group’s main viewpoint will not be taken seriously and will be deformed to make them even more irrelevant or ridiculed. This phenomenon both divides societies and further reifies identities.

Fourth is the *moral relativism* issue. Barry (2001) was particularly wary of the post-modern cultural relativism which, according to him, informs much of the debates over identity politics. He rhetorically asked, “How could anybody seriously imagine that citing the mere fact of a tradition or custom could ever function as a self-contained justificatory move?” (Barry, 2001, p. 253). Respect for one’s culture, in itself, cannot serve as justification and Barry highlights some theoretical inconsistencies with such line of argument. This type of argument can be found in some anthropological literature that deals with recognition. For example, Elizabeth Povinelli (2002), in the context of indigenous recognition in Australia, argues that

we should pay heed to how a naturalized hierarchy of moral and legal authority is re-established at the very moment common and customary laws are formally equated. Remember: an invisible asterisk, a proviso, hovers above every enunciation of customary law: (provided they]…are not so repugnant). (p. 176)
By repugnant, Povinelli means antithetical to Western values. For Barry (2001), however, it is common sense that a culture depending on violence for its survival, for example, needs to change. Furthermore, some authors also question the well-meaning approach to pluralism that can sometimes lead proponents of multiculturalism to support misogynistic worldviews (Okin, 1998). In fact, it could be argued that it is unclear why change, as such, is considered a bad thing or why it would necessarily endanger a culture since cultures are not static but constantly evolving and change might be a positive thing and help a culture flourish (Barry, 2001). Great civilisations throughout history have grown through contact with other cultures, not isolation. Of course, the changes that altered colonised people’s ways of life as a result of colonisation were extremely negative but they resulted from coercion and violence, not from contact and exposure to new ideas and ways of life as such.

The fifth challenge relates to what I call the *pacification/normalisation issue*. This issue relates to the tendency of legal recognition (embedded through multicultural policies) to coopt disadvantaged groups and is articulated by Wendy Brown (1995). She argues that,

> while rights may operate as an indisputable force of emancipation at one moment in history […] they may become at another time a regulatory discourse, a means of obstructing or coopting more radical political demands, or simply the most hollow of empty promises. (Brown, 1995, p. 98)

Further, she rhetorically asks:

> When do rights sought by identity “for itself” become “in themselves” a means of administration? When does identity articulated through rights become production and regulation of identity through law and bureaucracy? When does legal recognition become an instrument of regulation, and political recognition become an instrument of subordination? (Brown, 1995, p. 99)

For Brown (1995), politicised identity is both the product and reaction of *ressentiment*. Here, “reaction” acquires the meaning Nietzsche ascribed to it: namely, an effect of domination that reiterates impotence, a substitute for action, for power, for self-affirmation that reinscribes incapacity, powerlessness, and rejection” (Brown, 1995, p. 69). How can differentiated rights policies reiterate impotence and reinforce powerlessness? According to Brown’s neo-Nietzschean and Foucauldian critique these policies reduce disadvantaged groups to powerless subjects in need for state assistance for their wellbeing and development. Legal battles informed by grievances about the past replace affirmative political actions oriented towards the future and absorption within oppressive institutions replaces the radical transformation of these institutions. Differentiated rights policies become yet another tool of governmentality.
increasing state power while decreasing the political agency of the subjects of these policies. This type of criticism was raised by Glen Sean Coulthard (2014) in the context of indigenous recognition in Canada.

I believe that the aforementioned criticisms highlight some very real issues with “identity politics.” I argue that these issues only represent real challenges, however, when the theory of recognition is conflated with liberal multiculturalism. The first section of this paper described a theory of recognition that is, at the theoretical level, mostly immune to these criticisms because of its emphasis on freedom and equality as the objects of recognition (instead of identity). In the next section, I argue that a theory of recognition that materialises through an increase in deliberative practices instead of multicultural policies could avoid the pitfalls highlighted here.

**Recognition and deliberative democracy**

Rainer Forst (2007) argues that the theory of recognition goes beyond the recognition of rights embedded in a legal system of recognition such as the systems of differentiated rights promoted by proponents of liberal multiculturalism. He emphasises the fact that demands for recognition must be intelligible and appeal to norms that are justifiable to the other side of the struggle if recognition is to go beyond mere formal legal recognition and instead materialise through mentality changes. He argues that “a critical theory of (in)justice has to be first and foremost a critique of the existing relations of justification (or of ‘justificatory power’)” (Forst, 2007, p. 299). Forst (2007) highlights the fact that current systems of injustice rely on the prevalence of particular norms within society and these norms materialise through institutional frameworks because of their “justificatory power” (p.299). Altering these norms is necessary to reach genuine institutional transformations but altering these norms also means that claims for recognition need to be, to a certain extent, validity claims. In other words, recognition is reached if the bearer of the non or misrecognised identity can prove that the denial of recognition is unjustifiable. I argue that this process is only possible if relations of recognition are embedded, at the social and political level, in deliberative practices. James Tully (2004) argues in favour of such a dialogical approach to recognition. According to Owen (2012), with Tully’s approach to recognition, struggles waged by individuals or groups are understood as “struggles over recognition in which the form and content of recognition is governed by the conditions of public reasoning […] and the actual processes of deliberation and contestation in which citizens engage” (Owen, 2012, p. 102).

In such a case therefore, for Tully (2004),

> The central questions then become, first, how to develop institutions that are always open to the partners in practices of governance to call into question and renegotiate freely the always less-than-perfect norms of
mutual recognition to which they are subject, with a minimum of exclusion and assimilation, and to be able to negotiate reasonably fairly without recourse to force, violence and war. Yet, second, participation in these open practices of dialogues (practices whose norms of recognition must also be open to negotiation) must also help to generate a sense of mutual understanding and trust among the contesting partners and an attachment to the system of governance under dispute, even, among those members who do not always achieve the recognition they seek. (pp. 85-86)

I argue that political institutions that are informed by deliberative democratic theory can answer the two aforementioned concerns and that Tully’s emphasis on the dialogical and agonistic dimensions of the politics of recognition has many advantages. First, it does away with the ideal of authenticity and, therefore, is immune to the criticisms over the reifying aspect of the politics of recognition. Indeed, according to Tully (2004), the identities which are to be recognised in struggles over recognition are partly altered and created (or recreated) in the very process of deliberation over the norms of recognition. In this way, Tully’s understanding of the politics of recognition is very close to Renault’s (2004b) ideal of a politicisation of identity whereby “the weakened identity defends its normative potential by justifying its legitimacy against the tendencies questioning it” (pp. 133-134) while engaging in a self-reflective approach to reflect upon which aspects of the identity are essential and which aspects can be negotiated or transformed. Tully (2004) also emphasises the importance of the fact that those engaged in such civic deliberation over recognition need to experience and accept their identities in the first person and that “if an elite determines them they are experienced as imposed and alien” (p. 92). This is an important theoretical insight since elites can play a negative role in relations of recognition. In New Zealand, for example, Rata (2003) argues that indigenous elites have developed a form of “neotribal capitalism” that hardly benefits the masses of Māori that still live in poverty. Second, Tully’s model of recognition is also critical of the current “cultural recognition” paradigm embodied through the implementation of multicultural policies in liberal states. Indeed, according to him,

these attempts have generated further problems in theory and practice. The most powerful and vocal minorities gain public recognition at the expense of the least powerful and most oppressed; the set of rights tend to freeze the minority in a specific configuration of recognition; they fail to protect minorities within the groups who gained recognition; and they do little to develop a sense of attachment to the larger cooperative association among the members of minorities, occasionally increasing

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3 While I am focusing on Tully’s work in this article, the relationship between identity politics and deliberative democracy has been discussed elsewhere (Quong, 2003; Williams, 2000).
fragmentation and secession (the problem they were supposed to solve). (Tully, 2004, pp. 90-91)

These observations relate to both the “reification” and “divide and rule” issues mentioned in the previous section. Tully sees two main reasons behind such failure. First, “the solutions are handed down to the members from on high, from theorists, courts or policy-makers, rather than passing through the democratic will formation of those who are subjected to them. They are thus experienced as imposed rather than self-imposed” (Tully, 2004, p. 91). This is a characteristic of liberal multicultural policies and reinforces the role played by elites and identity entrepreneurs. Second is the idea that “there are definitive and final solutions to struggles over recognition in theory and practice” (Tully, 2004, p. 91). Here Tully criticises the way theorists emphasize the dimension of reconciliation in the struggles for recognition instead of letting the struggle itself be part of the solution. Such an emphasis results in a potential process of reification of identities from without whereby identities are monolithic and separated by rigid boundaries instead of being produced through a political process leaving room for more plastic and dialogical identities to be constructed through the process of “identity politics” itself. This is consistent with deliberative theory since it is argued that a key dimension of deliberative democracy is its impact on subjectivities. As Joshua Cohen (2009) argues, a deliberative system will “shape the content of preferences and convictions as well.” Indeed, “assuming a commitment to deliberative justification, the discovery that I can offer no persuasive reasons on behalf of a proposal may transform the preferences that motivate the proposal” (Cohen, 2009, p. 26). This means that participants committed to a deliberative process need to be ready to reassess their ethical and political views if compelled by the burden of evidence. This aspect of deliberative democracy is directly related to the theory of recognition as identities engaged in a struggle for recognition through deliberative means, therefore, both shape and are shaped by the struggle in a dialectical manner. This dimension of deliberative democracy will have a countering effect on the potential reifying tendencies of “identity politics.”

Deliberative democratic theory also highlights the epistemic function (seeking truth) of deliberation. This function depends on the proper functioning of the deliberative system. In such system, the participants need to justify their positions by providing reasoned arguments, so that, in Habermas’ (1975) word, “no force except that of the better argument is exercised” (p. 108). The epistemic function of deliberative institutions offers an argument against the “moral relativism” criticism raised against policies of recognition because normative positions need to be defended by appealing to norms that are intelligible to the other. As I will explain in the next section, however, this emphasis on exchanges of reasons also creates some challenges.

The epistemic dimension of deliberative practices coupled with what is sometimes referred to as the “democratic dimension” (increased popular input
in decision-making processes) of public deliberation could potentially also solve the displacement issue described in the previous section. If, as Fraser (2003) argues, recognition policies ignore issues related to economic injustice and, consequently, do not answer some of the gravest issues faced by some sectors of the population, then the epistemic dimension of deliberation will uncover this issue while the democratic dimension of deliberative democracy will enable people to influence these policies in a direction that favours fairer economic redistribution. In other words, minority groups affected by misrecognition would be able to identify the main causes of their misrecognition (economic and/or “symbolic”) and propose policies that target these causes. As Ricardo Fabrino Mendonça (2014) argues, “if clashes of discourses are promoted, instead of ignored or neglected, better solutions may emerge” (p. 44). By better solutions, Mendonça means solutions that better embody the normative ideal of self-realization and it is very possible that, in some cases, redistributive measures may benefit people more than symbolic measures. The superiority of a dialogical approach to recognition is particularly true when forms of recognition conflict with one another (Mendonça, 2014) and some decisions that will favour one form of recognition over another need to be taken (for example, financial settlements for land disputes may improve the socio-economic status of some indigenous groups while weakening their potential for political self-determination).

Recognition is improved by direct engagement (or “contact”) between different identities (Dovidio, Gaertner, & Kawakami, 2003) and deliberation between elites in closed rooms cannot replace the embodied experience of being confronted, and interacting, with people with different identities. This phenomenon arises with liberal multicultural policies. A state can “recognise” a particular group through an impressive set of differentiated rights without creating any form of institutions that would allow the individuals from the different groups belonging to the polis to ever meet and exchange ideas. I argue that recognition cannot be achieved in such context of extreme mediation by institutions in relations of recognition because “legal forms of recognition, necessary as they may be, are not in themselves sufficient to bring about the required symbolic and cultural change at the level of everyday practice” (Kompridis, 2007, p. 285). Deliberative democracy offers an alternative by allowing more direct interaction between people and these direct interactions are more promising for recognition to arise as it creates the conditions for the individuals’ agency to increase. The interactions could change the way misrecognisers think about the misrecognised but it would also change the way misrecognised perceive themselves. Frantz Fanon (1965, 2008) argued that a form of struggle by colonised people was necessary for them to believe in their equality when misrecognition was so traumatic that it was internalised. Deliberative democracy would offer the possibility for this intuition to materialise in non-violent ways.
The deliberative approach to recognition proposed in this section offers an answer to many criticisms raised against the multiculturalist approach to the theory of recognition. It is also consistent with Nancy Fraser’s (2003) previously discussed argument that relates questions of recognition to the normative ideal of parity of participation in society and to avoid the political issue of misrepresentation that is, according to her, and because of her emphasis on participation, the “characteristic political injustice” (Fraser, 2008, p. 279). We can also see how such deliberative approach to recognition is much more consistent with its Hegelian roots than liberal multiculturalism. A deliberative politics of recognition embodies the ideal of a face to face, unmediated struggle between potential equals (Fanon, 1965, 2008). The process of deliberation itself can have an impact on subjectivities and the increased input in political decisions, along with the sense of self-esteem arising from increased agency could promote the freedom of those engaged in the political process. This freedom is closely related to one’s sense of identity but this sense of identity, in such deliberative settings, would be the product of the agent’s action, not of preconceived notions derived from state (or traditional) political elites. This approach, however, also faces some serious challenges.

**Challenges to a deliberative approach to recognition**

In the previous section, I argued that reducing the mediation between groups in relations of recognition through deliberative practices could lead to better relations of recognition. It is important, however, to make sure that the contact between groups is organised through well-designed deliberative institutions since “negative contact” experiences can increase harmful attitudes and stereotypes between groups (McKeown & Dixon, 2017). If a minority group, for example, is constantly perceived as less articulate and educated than other groups, deliberation may increase misrecognition. This is a real danger given that the members of misrecognised groups often have less access to higher education for a variety of reasons related to their lower socio-economic status and may also, sometimes, be less involved and interested in political debates. It is not self-evident (as Honneth argues in his work) that the experience of social suffering and disrespect related to misrecognition necessarily leads to political awareness and struggles for recognition. In many cases, the experience of social suffering does not lead to social protest but, instead, to self-destructive behaviours such as substance abuse or, ultimately, suicide.

It could be argued, however, that self-defeating behaviours and the lack of interest/competency in political matters for individuals belonging to these groups is related to the phenomenon of “rational ignorance.” This phenomenon refers to the fact that it makes sense (it is “rational”) for a citizen to avoid spending the required time and effort necessary to be properly informed about complex policies (to be “ignorant”) if, in the end, his or her voice will only be one in millions and will, therefore, have a negligible effect on the direction taken by these policies. Conversely, if a citizen knows that his or her voice will be
heard through deliberative mechanisms, it makes sense (it becomes “rational”) for him or her to be informed about these policies. The rationality of being informed about policies increases as the chances of having a real impact on the policy design and the adoption of these policies increases (Fishkin, 2009). Deliberative mechanisms that increase the chances for citizens’ input in politics to be meaningful, therefore, also increase the common citizens’ interest in politically relevant affairs. James Fishkin (2009) demonstrated that citizen competency in making informed decisions over political matters also increased regardless of social status when placed in the right deliberative conditions. His method of deliberative polling (Fishkin, 2009) that incorporates an element of sortition (through the creation of a scientific random sample for a given population) democratizes deliberation by giving a voice to the common members of a group while decreasing the impact of elites on decision-making processes.

The problem of elite-driven recognition is, however, normatively complicated and it could be argued that the democratization of deliberation proposed by scholars such as Fishkin may reproduce some forms of misrecognition. This problem is highlighted by McBride (2005) who argues that there are “strong currents within the politics of recognition that run counter to this democratisation of deliberation, chiefly the suggestion that citizens defer to the authority of group representatives” (p. 499). Issues related to the recognition of indigenous people, again, offer a great example of this tension because some indigenous cultures are highly hierarchical and Fishkin’s approach would downplay the role of indigenous authorities in decision-making processes. This problem is an example of contradicting forms of recognition that highlight the tensions between the many different normative ideals that shape theories of recognition. The argument developed in this article, however, is that these tensions need to be subjected to deliberative processes amongst the communities at stake. The fact that some indigenous people in fact value deliberation as part of their socio-political practices (Robinson & Robinson, 2005; Sieder & Barrera, 2017) highlight the potential for deliberative theory to develop culturally embedded forms of deliberative practices that would not produce a new form of misrecognition while, at the same time, tackling some of the problems arising from the elite-driven multicultural policies mentioned in the introduction.

Another issue, however, arises from the requirements of deliberative democracy and is related to the modes of argumentation promoted by theorists of deliberative democracy. As I explained, the epistemic dimension of deliberative democracy emphasises the importance of rationality and distinguishes between “good” and “bad” arguments. What counts as a “good argument,” however, could itself be the stage of a struggle over recognition and, in fact, “disagreements over credibility of speakers are a common feature of social life” (Russell, 2016, p. 161). Therefore, the phenomenon of “epistemic injustice” (the
fact that the validity of some knowledge, views and opinions are devalued because of the identity of those expressing these knowledge, views and opinions) (Giladi, 2017) needs to be overcome if the epistemic dimension of deliberative democracy is to be fulfilled and relations of respects between equals established. A key aspect of Jacques Rancière’s (1999) political philosophy is that political conflicts are often conflicts over the meaning of words and their normative content and this phenomenon represents a challenge for deliberative struggles for recognition that emphasise the importance of communication between groups.

This criticism highlights the potential western-centric dimension of deliberative democracy. Some critics argue that deliberative democracy’s emphasis on reason imposes alien norms on non-western cultural groups (indigenous people for example) and could, therefore, again, create misrecognition. Critics argue that deliberative democracy’s focus on rational argumentation and reasonability “tends to exclude those who are unable or unwilling to restrict their expression to what is understood to be a reasonable argument” (Smits, 2008, p. 241). While this argument is valuable to broaden our understanding of a plurality of modes of reasonable argument it is also highly problematic. Indeed, the idea that rational argumentation is necessarily a white male normative ideal is, firstly, empirically false⁴ and, secondly, dangerously essentialising. Deliberative institutions, therefore, need to be designed in a way that allows for the expression of a plurality of modes of expression and thinking while avoiding an epistemic and moral relativism that would be consistent with some of the criticisms raised against identity politics.

I hope to have shown that the potential challenges highlighted this far are not decisive. The questions related to the potential inclusion (or exclusion) of illiberal groups in the deliberative process remains, however, problematic for a theory of recognition that favours deliberation as a key mechanism in promoting recognition-oriented intersubjective relations. Selen Ercan (2017) tackles this issue in the context of Islamic extremism in Australia. She argues that multiculturalism is ill-equipped to accommodate extremist groups but also that deliberative democracy, because of its emphasis on consensus and rationality, would exclude these groups (Ercan, 2017). She argues that a more agonistic approach to deliberative democracy may be required in some cases to bring these groups into the dialogue (Ercan, 2017). Agonism could play a valuable role in establishing more peaceful relations between people that abide by very different value systems. It should be noted, however, that a focus on agonism is difficult to articulate to a theory of recognition that emphasises mutual recognition between equals. More research on the relationship between

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⁴ Rational argumentation and deliberation is a feature of some Islamic school of thoughts, for example (Pirsoul, 2017).
dialogical approaches to recognition and illiberal groups is necessary but beyond the scope of this article.

The challenges discussed in this section raise the question of the implementation of a deliberative corrective to policies of recognition. In other words, how do we approach Tully’s main preoccupation which is to find out “how to develop institutions that are always open to the partners in practices of governance to call into question and renegotiate freely the always less-than-perfect norms of mutual recognition to which they are subject” (Tully, 2004, p. 85)? The relationship between institutions and recognition is complex and Tully’s quote seems to express the view that institutions should create a space for dialogue over norms of recognition to take place. It has been argued (Renault, 2004a, 2011), however, that theories of recognition should move from an expressivistic conception of institutions to one which also encompasses a constitutive concept of the relations between institutions and recognition. This means that we need to recognize that institutions do not only express more or less pre-institutional relations of recognition in which case “institutions constitute only the conditions either of stabilization of the relations of recognition, or the perpetuation of the obstacles for their development” (Renault, 2004a, p. 196). Instead, they are also constitutive of these relations; they produce them and, therefore, have an impact on the production of identities. Institutions are not the neutral field of interactions for recognition to take place as they influence these very relations. I argue that this final consideration on the role of institutions and the constitutive understanding of the relations between institutions and recognition further reinforces my argument in favour of a deliberative approach to recognition: deliberative institutions, because of their emphasis on a direct exchange of reasons between equals in an environment that promotes mutual respect would lay the ground for identities (on all sides partaking in the exchange) to evolve in the process. A deliberative approach to recognition would reshape beliefs and identities much more deeply than multicultural policies that are designed by (and for?) elites without allowing cross-identity exchanges to occur.

**Conclusion and Explorations**

In this paper, I highlighted the differences between a theory of recognition embedded in Hegelian and continental philosophy and policies of recognition that materialise through liberal multicultural policies. I showed that recognition as liberal multiculturalism departs from the original intents of the theory of recognition and faces a number of theoretical and practical challenges. I argued that a deliberative corrective to liberal multiculturalism could counter some potentially negative effects of top-down, elite-driven, multicultural policies. I do not argue that deliberative democracy should replace liberal multicultural polices but instead that they should be embedded in these policies with the goal of improving their potential for recognition. If, however, some of these policies were to be identified as harmful by the members of the groups that they are
supposed to help, they should, obviously, be amended and/or removed. Multiculturalism as a political project currently faces many challenges but the approach offered in this article attempted to offer a robust argument in favour of a deliberative multiculturalism that may give a satisfactory answer to many sceptics and detractors of a political model that was meant, originally, to improve cross-identities relations.

While my assessment of liberal multicultural policies was informed by empirical research on the challenges arising from the implementation of policies of “recognition” in several plural societies (mainly Colombia and New Zealand), my argument in favour of a deliberative corrective to liberal multicultural policies remained mainly theoretical. It is, however, important to conduct empirical research on the topic. It would be particularly interesting to track attitudinal changes towards the “other” after deliberation and see how different deliberative arrangements and practices influence, positively or negatively, the results. Some work aimed at understanding changes in the perceptions of other groups has been carried out already. For example, a deliberative poll initiative in Northern Ireland offered promising results as it showed that deliberation can improve the perception of “the other” in deeply divided societies (Luskin, O'Flynn, Fishkin, & Russel, 2014).

While I believe in deliberative democracy’s potential to generate mutual respect and understanding between groups divided by ethnic, cultural, religious, and ideological differences, I am also aware that a minimum level of mutual recognition is required from the start to engage in a deliberative process. I, therefore, suspect that the model of recognition presented in this paper would work better in divided societies that share a minimum of respect between groups and does not have a recent history of violence. For extremely divided and violent societies (Iraq for example), deliberative practices would need to be implemented slowly and progressively. This progressive implementation could start from within groups and focus on “needs” (instead of deeper moral disagreements) in order to nurture a deliberative culture that could, when solidified, be spread to broader deliberation across differences. Other complicating factors for a deliberative process focused on recognition may also arise when involving traditional collectivistic societies that emphasise group harmony or respect and devotion for the role of chiefs and elders since deliberative practices may, arguably, sometimes decrease group cohesion by giving an equal voice to all members of the group.
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